In this paper, we introduce the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem in which a set of processes decide on a vector of values, where each value is a proposal made anonymously by a single process. In a distributed survey, for example, a solution to anonymous proposer vector consensus allows non-faulty processes to put forward a potentially controversial opinion that is not tied to their identity. More specifically, a non-faulty process' proposal is indistinguishable from that of all non-faulty processes, even in the presence of timing attacks. We also define the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast problem which ensures the properties of reliable broadcast [11] hold with the same anonymity guarantee. For each problem, we present a protocol that solves it in presence of Byzantine faults. Solving anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) executes in two regular and one anonymous message delays with the same message complexity as n invocations of Bracha's reliable broadcast protocol [9]. Solving anonymous proposer vector consensus, Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP) is a reduction to binary consensus which can terminate in three regular and one anonymous message delay.
Introduction
The vector consensus problem [4, 25, 45] involves identified processes deciding on a vector of values, each of which was proposed by one process. By contrast to interactive consistency [39] , a protocol solving vector consensus need not assume synchrony. Consider a distributed survey, where a group of mutually distrusting processes wish to exchange opinions about a given issue. With vector consensus alone, processes are inextricably tied to their opinion. When this is undesirable-in whistle-blowing and electronic voting, for example-it is of interest to allow processes to anonymously propose their value. Importantly, using vector consensus for an election allows the contents of a proposal (vote) to be arbitrary. In voting for a leader, say, if the pool of candidates is sufficiently large-a population, say-the viable decentralised alternative, homomorphic tallying [2,21], becomes infeasible, as votes must be encoded as values that can be meaningfully summed prior to decryption.
Motivated by this, we define the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem, which extends vector consensus by asserting that all non-faulty processes cannot be associated with their proposal with probability greater than random guessing. We define anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast analogously with respect to reliable broadcast [11] . Our primary contribution, Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP), relies on a solution to anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP). Both protocols are correct in the presence of Byzantine faults. We also show that by composing AVCP and threshold encryption [22, 53] , the contents of all non-faulty processes' proposals can remain hidden until after AVCP terminates, which enables a form of electronic voting. In contexts where individual proposals (votes) can be eventually made public, this privacy guarantee can suffice. One promising application is in a replicated state machine with an appropriate mechanism for reconfiguration [38] , such as a consortium blockchain [57] , for governing the addition and removal of decider processes.
To achieve anonymity, we combine traceable ring signatures [29] , which enable processes to anonymously prove their membership in a set of processes, and anonymous communication channels. Critically, the signatures expose a signer's identity if and only if they sign two different messages, ensuring a process can only propose a single value to the consensus. Particularly because our protocols rely on both anonymous and regular channels, latency [3] and message transmission ordering [48] can diminish the anonymity provided by the anonymous channels themselves. To cope, we assume non-faulty processes anonymously broadcast their message after any previous instance of AVCP terminates, and that every process delivers these messages in a random order. To cope, we assume that processes anonymously broadcast in a window of synchrony and that messages that are anonymously sent are delivered to processes in a random order. These measures ensure that, in the view of the adversary, each message received by a process under their control could have been sent by any non-faulty process. The synchrony assumption can also allow more than n − t proposals to be decided in vector consensus, which is useful in electronic voting. For efficiency and to reduce the impact of correlation-based attacks [42] in practice, processes anonymously broadcast once in a given protocol execution.
AVCP is an efficient reduction to a partially-synchronous binary consensus protocol [20] , possibly terminating after three regular and one anonymous message delays. AARBP terminates after two regular and one anonymous message delays in general and has identical message complexity to n instances of Bracha's seminal reliable broadcast protocol [9] . In constructing AVCP, we demonstrate that AARBP can be used as a primitive in other protocols. Our experimental results are promising-with 100 geo-distributed nodes, AVCP generally terminated in less than ten seconds.
Related work. A protocol that solves the anonymous consensus problem [33] involves a set of processes without identifiers reaching consensus. Anonymous consensus protocols tolerating crash failures under asynchrony [8] and tolerating Byzantine failures under synchrony [46] have been proposed. Our goal is different in that processes with identifiers aim at reaching consensus by proposing their value anonymously. Anonymous channels can be instantiated using publiclydeployed [24, 59] networks, which have varying guarantees [30, 44] . In-house solutions that do not require additional processes [18, 32] and that are robust [31, 37] can also be used.
Consensus protocols, including AVCP (and excluding failure detector-based solutions [4]), can be constructed to accept proposals satisfying some notion of validity even if proposed by Byzantine processes [13, 20] . For example, a Byzantine process may propose a well-formed ballot in a decentralised electronic election. We have avoided leader-based protocol design [16] due to expensive view-change and the ability for a leader to support and exclude proposals with great freedom. Randomisation [14, 43, 47] could be used to avoid the reliance on the weak coordinator in DBFT [20] , although ensues cryptographic overhead. A limited number of protocols solving vector consensus in the literature have been proposed, including those involving failure detectors [4, 25] , wormholes [45] and explicit partial synchrony [19] . A reduction to binary consensus has been used in solving similar problems to vector consensus [6, 20, 23] .
To ensure both anonymity and that processes only propose one value, linkable ring signatures [40] , which can be more efficient in size [55] and computational effort [41] than traceable ring signatures, can be used, although traceability ensures that Byzantine processes are held accountable when double-signing. Systems that ensure anonymity amongst a distributed set of users that rely on blind signatures [17] can be constructed [15] , but, unlike our protocols, rely on a trusted authority beyond the initial setup. Relevant cryptocurrencies that preserve the privacy of individual transactions, rather than that of consensus participants, include Monero [54] and Zcash [36] .
Roadmap. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides preliminary definitions and establishes the system model for our protocols. Section 3 explores anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast and presents AARBP. Section 4 explores anonymous proposer vector consensus and presents AVCP. For simplicity, we present AARBP and AVCP in Sections 3 and 4 without considering anonymity in the presence of timing attacks, which we consider in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and proposes directions for future research. Appendices A, B and C contain the correctness proof of AARBP, a description of the binary consensus algorithm which AVCP relies on [20] , and the correctness proof of AVCP, respectively. Appendix D combines AVCP and threshold encryption and characterises the resulting voting scheme. Appendix E provides empirical evaluations of our protocols on up to 100 nodes distributed on three continents.
Model and preliminaries
We assume the existence of a set of processes P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } (where |P | = n, and the ith process is p i ), an adversary A who corrupts up to t < n 3 processes in P , and a trusted dealer D. We work in the authenticated model, where cryptographic primitives are unbreakable by assumption. With concrete primitives, each party could be modelled as being able to execute a number of instructions bounded by a polynomial in a security parameter k.
Network: We assume that P consists of asynchronous, sequential processes that communicate over reliable, point-to-point channels in an asynchronous network. An asynchronous process is one that executes instructions at its own pace. We note that sequential processes may multiplex instruction execution. An asynchronous network is one where message delays are unbounded. A reliable network is such that any message sent will eventually be delivered by the intended recipient. We assume that processes can also communicate using one-way anonymous channels. In these, the identity of the sending process, who may not even be a member of P , is unknown to the recipient.
Since consensus is impossible in the general case in failure-prone asynchronous message-passing systems [27], we assume partial synchrony holds among processes in P to reach consensus in Section 4. That is, we assume there exists a point in time in protocol execution, the global stabilisation time (GST), after which all message transfer delays are upper bounded by an (unknown) finite constant [26] . To mitigate de-anonymisation attacks based on message delivery timing, we require both an additional synchrony assumption and an assumption on the order of anonymous message delivery being random. Both assumptions, and the motivation behind them, are described in Section 5.
Each process is equipped with the primitive "send m to p j ", which sends the message m (possibly a tuple) to process p j ∈ P . For simplicity, we assume that p j can send a message to itself. A process receives a message by invoking the primitive "receive()". Each process may invoke "broadcast m", which is short-hand for "for each p i ∈ P do send m to p i end for". Analogously, processes may invoke "anon send m to p j " and "anon broadcast m", which refers to the sending and broadcast of message m, respectively, over anonymous channels. A process receives a message sent via a "anon send" call by invoking the primitive "anon receive()".
Adversary: We assume that the adversary A schedules message delivery over the reliable channels. For each send call made, A determines when the corresponding receive call is invoked. A portion of processes-up to t members of P -may be initially corrupted by A and therefore exhibit Byzantine faults [39] over the lifetime of a protocol's execution. That is, they may deviate from the predefined protocol in an arbitrary way. We assume A can see all computations and messages sent and received by corrupted processes. We assume processes can only be corrupted by the adversary. A non-faulty process is one that is not corrupted by A and therefore follows the prescribed protocol. A cannot observe anon send and anon receive calls made by non-faulty processes. A cannot see the (local) computations that non-faulty processes perform.
Trusted setup: We assume an initial trusted setup, in which the trusted dealer, D, generates the initial state for P . In practice, D generates keying material for cryptographic primitives.
Performance: For protocol analysis, we consider message complexity, the number of messages sent by non-faulty processes, and communication complexity or bit complexity, the number of bits transferred. We consider worst-case complexity as well as fault-free complexity, which is defined as the complexity when no process acts faulty.
Traceable ring signatures. Informally, a ring signature [29, 50] allows a process to produce a signature that verifies its membership with respect to an ad-hoc set of public keys without revealing its identity. Variant schemes with weakened anonymity levels [29, 40] allows two messages signed by the same process to be linked or traced together. While linking does not reveal the signer's identity, tracing does.
Hereafter, we consider traceable ring signatures (or TRSs), which are ring signatures that provide a traceability guarantee. To increase flexibility, we can consider traceability with respect to a particular string called an issue. Issue-dependent traceability [56] allows signers to maintain anonymity if they sign multiple messages, provided each message is signed with respect to a different issue. Our definitions are analogous to those of Fujisaki and Suzuki [29] .
Let ID ∈ {0, 1} * , which we denote as a tag. With respect to these definitions, we assume that all processes may query an idealised distributed oracle, which implements the following four operations:
1. σ ← Sign(i, ID, m), which takes the integer i ∈ {1..n}, tag ID ∈ {0, 1} * and message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs the signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * . We restrict Sign such that only process p i ∈ P may invoke Sign with first argument i. 2. b ← VerifySig(ID, m, σ), which takes the tag ID, message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. All processes may query VerifySig. 3. out ← Trace(ID, m, σ, m , σ ), which takes the tag ID ∈ {0, 1} * , messages m, m ∈ {0, 1} * and signatures σ, σ ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs out ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {1, . . . , n} (possibly corresponding to a process p i ). All processes may query Trace. 4. x ← FindIndex(ID, m, σ) takes a tag ID ∈ {0, 1} * , a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and a signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a value x ∈ {1, . . . , n}. FindIndex may not be called by any party, and exists only for protocol definitions.
We describe the behaviour of the idealised distributed oracle:
• Signature correctness and unforgeability: VerifySig(ID, m, σ) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists some process p i ∈ P that previously invoked Sign(i, ID, m) and obtained σ as a response. Unforgeability is captured by the "⇒" claim.
• Traceability and entrapment-freeness: The function Trace behaves as defined below ⇐⇒ σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) and σ ← Sign(i , ID, m ):
Traceability is captured by the "⇐" claim: if m = m , then the messages are linked, otherwise, the identity of the signing process p i = p i is exposed. Entrapment-freeness is captured by the "⇒" claim: loosely, processes cannot be falsely accused of double-signing.
• Signature anonymity: Suppose σ ← Sign(i, ID, m), where p i ∈ P is non-faulty. Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability greater than 1 n−t . With respect to FindIndex(ID, m, σ), x ∈ {1..n} is output if and only if σ is the result of process p x having previously queried Sign(x, ID, m). The unforgeability property implies signature uniqueness: If calls σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) and σ ← Sign(j, ID, m ) are made, then σ = σ . The concrete scheme proposed by Fujisaki and Suzuki [29] satisfies these properties in the random oracle model [5] provided the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. It has signatures of size O(kn), where k is the security parameter. To simplify the presentation, we assume that its properties hold unconditionally in the following. In implementation, Fujisaki and Suzuki's scheme [29] requires ID = issue || pk 1 || · · · || pk n , where pk i denotes the ith process' public key, and issue is a string.
Anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast
To reach eventual agreement in the presence of Byzantine processes without revealing who proposes what, we introduce the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast problem that preserves the anonymity of each honest sender reliably broadcasting. In this primitive, all processes are assumed to (anonymously) broadcast a message, and all processes receive a set of messages. It ensures that all honest processes always receive the same message from one specific sender while hiding the identity of any non-faulty sender. To solve this problem when t < n 3 , we propose the Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) that combines (i) Bracha's reliable broadcast protocol [9] to guarantee that non-faulty processes eventually receive the same messages, (ii) Fujisaki and Suzuki's traceable ring signature scheme [29] to hold processes accountable if they attempt to propose twice and (iii) a regular broadcast via anonymous channels. We analyse its complexity and discuss some optimisations, but defer the analysis to Appendix A.
Let m be a message, and σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) a signature, where the identifier ID ∈ {0, 1} * identifies a given instance of AARB-broadcast. Each process is equipped with two operations, "AARBP" and "AARB-deliver". AARBP[ID](m) is invoked once with respect to ID, denoting the beginning of a process' execution of AARBP with respect to ID. AARB-deliver[ID](m, σ) is invoked between n − t and n times throughout protocol execution. When a process invokes AARB-deliver[ID](m, σ), they are said to "AARB-deliver" (m, σ) with respect to ID.
Then, given t < n 3 , we define a protocol that implements anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast (AARB-broadcast) with respect to an identifier ID that uniquely defines an instance of AARBbroadcast as satisfying the following six properties:
1. AARB-Signing: If a non-faulty process p i AARB-delivers a message, then it must be of the form (m, σ), where a process p i ∈ P invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID, m).
AARB-Validity:
Suppose that a non-faulty process AARB-delivers (m, σ). Let i = FindIndex(ID, m, σ) denote the output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then if p i is non-faulty, p i must have anonymously broadcast (m, σ). 3. AARB-Unicity: Consider any point of time in which a non-faulty process p has AARBdelivered more than one tuple. Let delivered = {(m 1 , σ 1 ), · · · , (m k , σ k )}, where |delivered| = k, denote the set of these tuples. For each i ∈ {1..k}, let out i = FindIndex(ID, m i , σ i ) denote the output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then for all distinct pairs of tuples {(m i , σ i ), (m j , σ j )}, out i = out j .
4. AARB-Termination-1: If a process p i is non-faulty and invokes AARBP[ID](m), all the non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m, σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID, m). 5. ARB-Termination-2: If a non-faulty process AARB-delivers (m, σ), then all the non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m, σ).
We require AARB-Signing to ensure that the other properties are meaningful. Since messages are anonymously broadcast, properties refer to the index of the signing process determined by an idealised call to FindIndex. In spirit, AARB-Validity ensures if a non-faulty process AARB-delivers a message that was signed by a non-faulty process p i , then p i must have invoked AARBP. Similarly, AARB-Unicity ensures that a non-faulty process will AARB-deliver at most one message signed by each process. We note that AARB-Termination-2 is critical for consensus, as without it, different processes may AARB-deliver different messages produced by the same process, as in the two-step algorithm implementing no-duplicity broadcast [10, 49] . Finally, we state the anonymity property:
6. AARB-Anonymity: Let (m, σ) be a tuple anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process p i . Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability P r > 1 n−t .
Informally, AARB-Anonymity guarantees that the source of an anonymously broadcast message by a non-faulty process is unknown to the adversary, in that it is indistinguishable from n − t (non-faulty) processes.
State and messages. Each process in P begins with two empty buffers: m buffer , corresponding to messages that they may AARB-deliver, and m delivered , corresponding to all messages that they have AARB-delivered. Each process also tracks ID, which uniquely identifies an instance of AARB-broadcast. For a given instance of AARBP identified by ID, all messages sent by nonfaulty processes must contain ID. Similarly, messages must contain one of three headers: INIT, corresponding to the initial broadcast of a process' proposal, ECHO, corresponding to an acknowledgement of the INIT message, or READY, corresponding to an acknowledgement that enough processes have received the message to ensure eventual, safe AARB-delivery.
Protocol. We now present AARBP (Algorithm 1). To begin, each process p i broadcasts (ID,INIT, m , σ ) over anonymous channels (line 7), where σ ← Sign(i, ID, m ). Upon first receipt of each message of the form (ID,INIT, m, σ), a process checks the following (line 8):
• Whether the signature σ is well-formed as per VerifySig, verifying the signer's membership in P (line 9).
• Whether any message in m buffer ∪ m delivered is not independent from m via Trace, ensuring AARB-Unicity as m is discarded if double-signing is detected (lines 11 to 14).
Then, given that (m, σ) passes the above checks, (ID,ECHO, m, σ) is broadcast (line 17). Note that this broadcast, and all subsequent broadcasts with respect to (m, σ), are performed over regular (reliable, non-anonymous) channels of communication. To mitigate de-anonymisation, the signer of m performs the same message processing and message propagation as all other non-faulty processes.
The rest of the protocol proceeds as per Bracha's reliable broadcast [9] : If processes receive (ID,ECHO, m, σ) from more than for each (m * , σ * ) ∈ m buffer ∪ m delivered do 12:
if Trace(ID, m, σ, m * , σ * ) = "indep" then 13:
valid ← false [29] were used. In AARBP, each process signs one message (O(n) work), verifies up to n messages (O(n 2 ) work), and perform tracing upon receipt of each INIT message (up to n). Naively, tracing signatures pairwise requires O(n) operations, and so processes have to perform O(n)+2O(n)+· · ·+(n−1)O(n) = O(n 3 ) work. This can be sped up by populating a hash table with the individual values of each tag as defined in [29] . Thus, processes can perform n expected O(1) lookups per tuple (m, σ), requiring O(n 2 ) expected work tracing overall.
Anonymous proposer vector consensus
In this section, we introduce the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem and present and discuss the protocol Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP) that solves it. We defer its proof to Appendix C. The anonymous proposer vector consensus problem brings anonymity to the vector consensus problem [25] where non-faulty processes reach an agreement upon a vector containing at least n − t proposed values. More precisely, the anonymous proposer vector consensus ensures that a process' proposal is indistinguishable from that of all non-faulty processes. In electronic voting, this provides a natural mechanism to prevent double-voting and enforce election eligibility requirements. Each process is equipped with two operations. Firstly, "AVCP[ID](m)" begins execution of an instance of AVCP with respect to the identifier ID and proposal m. Secondly, "AVC-decide[ID](V )" denotes the output of V from an instance of consensus, and is invoked exactly once with respect to ID. We define a protocol that solves anonymous vector consensus with respect to these operations as satisfying the following four properties:
1. AVC-Anonymity: Suppose that m is proposed by a non-faulty process p i . Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability P r > 1 n−t . It also requires the original agreement and termination properties of vector consensus to be ensured: 2. AVC-Agreement: All non-faulty processes that decide output the same vector V . 3. AVC-Termination: Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a vector of proposals.
It also requires a validity property that depends on a pre-determined, deterministic validity predicate valid() [13, 20] which we assume is common to all processes. We assume that all non-faulty processes propose a value that satisfies valid().
AVC-Validity:
Consider each non-faulty process. Each value v ∈ V that is decided must satisfy valid(), and |V | ≥ n − t. Further, at least |V | − t values correspond to the proposals of distinct non-faulty processes.
AVCP.
A simple protocol solving anonymous proposer vector consensus may be designed as follows: (i) Every process anonymously broadcasts (or sends to a leader) a message which is signed with a traceable ring signature; (ii) each process (or a leader) waits for the receipt of n − t messages that satisfy valid(); (iii) processes perform multivalued (or vector) consensus with respect to their ≥ n − t delivered, valid messages. Using a leader-based algorithm like PBFT [16] in step (iii) would enable the leader to impose any n − t valid values onto P . In particular, the leader may deliberately include values from a corrupt coalition and exclude other values. Using DBFT [20] directly would largely alleviate this issue, although would incur an additional message step and unduly increase communication complexity, since every TRS is of size O(kn) (thus every proposal is of size O(kn 2 )).
In contrast, we present a reduction which may converge in three message steps and one anonymous message step, by comparison to four message steps as in DBFT, and is similarly efficient in message complexity. The protocol is divided into two components. Firstly, the reduction component (Algorithm 2) reduces anonymous proposer vector consensus to binary consensus. It is similar to DBFT [20] , which in turn is similar to Ben-Or et al. 's [6] , in which n instances of reliable broadcast and binary consensus are executed. But, since proposals are made anonymously, processes cannot associate proposals with binary consensus instances a priori. Consequently, processes start with n unlabelled binary consensus instances, and label them over time with the hash digest of proposals they deliver (of the form h ∈ {0, 1} * ). To cope with messages sent and received in unlabelled binary consensus instances, we require a handler component (Algorithm 3) that replaces function calls made in binary consensus instances.
Functions. In addition to the communication primitives detailed in Section 2 and the two primitives "AVCP" and "AVC-decide", the following primitives may be called: "inst.bin propose(v)", where inst is an instance of binary consensus and v ∈ {0, 1}, begins execution of inst with initial value v, "AARBP" and "AARB-deliver", as in Section 3, "valid()" as described above, "m.keys()" (resp. "m.values()"), which returns the keys (resp. values) of a map m, "item.key()", which returns the key of item in a map m, "s.pop()", which removes and returns a value from set s, and "H(v)", Algorithm 2 AVCP (1 of 2): Reduction to binary consensus
wait until |decided ones| ≥ n − t 4:
Invoke inst.bin propose(0) 6:
wait until decision count = n 7:
AVC-decide[ID](decided ones)
if valid(m, σ) then deterministic, common validity function 11:
Invoke labelled [H(m || σ)].bin propose (1) if not yet invoked 13: upon inst deciding a value v ∈ {0, 1}, where inst ∈ labelled .values() ∪ unlabelled 14:
decision count ← decision count + 1 a collision-resistant hash function which returns h ∈ {0, 1} * based on v ∈ {0, 1} * .
State. Each process tracks the following variables: ID ∈ {0, 1} * , a common identifier for a given instance of AVCP. proposals[], which maps labels of the form l ∈ {0, 1} * to AARB-delivered messages of the form (m, σ) ∈ ({0, 1} * , {0, 1} * ) that may be decided, and is initially empty. decision count, tracking the number of binary consensus instances for which a decision has been reached, initialised to 0. decided ones, the set of proposals for which 1 was decided in the corresponding binary consensus instance, initialised to ∅. labelled [], which maps labels, which are the hash digest h ∈ {0, 1} * of AARB-delivered proposals, to binary consensus instances, and is initially empty. unlabelled , a set of binary consensus instances (initially of cardinality n) with no current label. ones[][], which maps two keys, EST and AUX, to maps with integer keys r ≥ 1 which map to a set of labels, all of which are initially empty. counts[][], which maps two keys, EST and AUX, to maps with integer keys r ≥ 1 which map to an integer n ∈ {0, . . . , n}, all of which are initially empty.
Messages. In addition to messages propagated in AARBP, non-faulty processes process messages of the form (ID,TAG, r, label , b), where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX}, r ≥ 1, label ∈ {0, 1} * and b ∈ {0, 1}. A process buffers a message (ID,TAG, r, label, b) until label labels an instance of binary consensus inst, at which point it is considered receipt in inst. The handler, described below, ensures that all messages sent by non-faulty processes eventually correspond to a label in their set labelled .keys(). Similarly, a process can only broadcast such a message after labelling the corresponding instance of binary consensus. Processes also process messages of the form (ID,TAG, r, ones), where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES}, r ≥ 1, and ones is a set of strings corresponding to binary consensus instance labels.
Reduction. In the reduction, n (initially unlabelled) instances of binary consensus are used, each corresponding to a value that one process in P may propose. Each (non-faulty) process invokes AARBP with respect to ID and their value m (line 2), anonymously broadcasting (m , σ ). On AARB-delivery of some message (m, σ), an unlabelled instance of binary consensus is deposited 31: upon receipt of (ID,TAG, r, ones), where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES} 32:
wait until one ∈ labelled .keys() ∀one ∈ ones 33: if TAG = EST ONES then 34:
TEMP ← EST 35:
else TEMP ← AUX 36:
for each l ∈ labelled .keys() such that l / ∈ ones do 37:
for each inst ∈ unlabelled do 39:
deliver (ID,TEMP, r, ⊥, 0) in inst into labelled , whose key (label) is set to H(m || σ) (line 9). Proposals that fulfil valid() are stored in proposals (line 11), and inst.bin propose(1) is invoked with respect to the newly labelled instance
if not yet done (line 12). Upon termination of each instance (line 13), provided 1 was decided, the corresponding proposal is added to decided ones (line 15). For either decision value, decision count is incremented (line 16). Once 1 has been decided in n − t instances of binary consensus, processes will propose 0 in all instances that they have not yet proposed in (line 5). Note that upon AARB-delivery of valid messages after this point, bin propose(1) is not invoked at line 12. Upon the termination of all n instances of binary consensus (after line 6), all non-faulty processes decide their set of values for which 1 was decided in the corresponding instance of binary consensus (line 7).
Handler. As proposals are anonymously broadcast, binary consensus instances cannot be associated with process identifiers a priori, and so are labelled by AARB-delivered messages. Thus, we require the handler, which overrides two of the three broadcast calls in the non-terminating variant of the binary consensus of [20] (Algorithm 4). We defer the reader to Appendix B for a description of the non-terminating algorithm, and the components of the terminating variant that require handling. We now describe the handler (Algorithm 3). Let inst be an instance of binary consensus. On calling inst.bin propose(b) (b ∈ {0, 1}) (and at the beginning of each round r > 1), processes invoke BV-broadcast (line 5 of Algorithm 4), immediately calling "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" (line 17 of Algorithm 4). If b = 1, (ID,EST, r, label , 1) is broadcast, and label is added to the set ones [EST] [r] (line 20). Note that, given AARB-Termination-2, all messages sent by non-faulty processes of the form (ID,EST, r, label , 1) will be deposited in an instance inst labelled by label . Then, as the binary consensus routine terminates when all non-faulty processes propose the same value, all processes will decide the value 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus (i.e. will pass line 3), after which they execute bin propose(0) in the remaining instances of binary consensus.
Since these instances may not be labelled when a process wishes to broadcast a value of the form (ID,EST, r, label, 0), we defer their broadcast until "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label, b)" is called in all n instances of binary consensus. At this point (line 22), (ID,EST ONES, r, ones[EST ][r]) is broadcast (line 23). A message of the form (ID,EST ONES, r, ones) is interpreted as the receipt of zeros in all instances not labelled by elements in ones (at lines 37 and 39). This can only be done once all elements of ones label instances of binary consensus (i.e., after line 32). Note that if |ones [EST] [r] = n|, then there are no zeroes to be processed by receiving processes, and so the broadcast at line 23 can be skipped.
Handling "broadcast (ID,AUX, r, label , b)" calls (line 7 of Algorithm 4) is identical to the handling of initial "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" calls. Note that the third broadcast in the original algorithm, where (ID,EST, r, label , b) is broadcast upon receipt from t + 1 processes if not yet done before (line 19 of Algorithm 4 (BV-Broadcast)), can only occur once the corresponding instance of binary consensus is labelled. Thus, it does not need to be handled. From here, we can see that messages in the handler are processed as if n instances of the original binary consensus algorithm were executing. 
Complexity and optimizations. Let k be a security parameter, and c the size of a message digest. We compare the message and communication complexity of AVCP with DBFT [20], which, as written, can be easily altered to solve vector consensus. We assume that AVCP is invoking the terminating variant of the binary consensus of [20] . When considering complexity, we only count messages in the binary consensus routines once the global stabilisation time (GST) has been reached [26] . Both fault-free and worst-case message complexity are identical between the two protocols. We remark that there exist runs of AVCP where processes are faulty with O(n 3 ) message complexity, such as when a process has crashed. In terms of communication complexity, AVCP is moderately more expensive due to the size of traceable ring signatures (O(kn)). Given TRS's of size O( √ n) [28] are instead used, fault-free and worst-case communication complexities for AVCP become O(cn 3 + kn 2 √ n) and O(kn 3 √ n + ctn 3 ) respectively. As is done in DBFT [20], we can combine the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast of a message m and the proposal of a 1 in the first round of a binary consensus instance. To this end, a process may skip the BV-broadcast step in round 1, which may allow AVCP to converge in three message steps and one anonymous message step.
It may be useful to invoke "broadcast TAG[r](b)", where TAG ∈ {EST,AUX} (lines 19 and 26) when the instance of binary consensus is labelled, rather than simply when b = 1 (i.e., the condition preceding these calls). Since it may take some time for all n instances of binary consensus to synchronise, doing this may speed up convergence in the "faster" instances. However, messages of the form TAG[r](ones), where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES}, would then often contain a larger ones set.
Anonymity in the presence of timing attacks
In our model, there are two modes of adversarial behaviour that can de-anonymise a non-faulty process in our protocols: (i) The adversary observes message transmission time between processes [3].
For example, suppose that the time taken for a process p to transmit a message to all other processes in P takes much longer than message transmission time between all other processes. Without additional assumptions, the adversary can often deduce p's identity with respect to its proposal.
(ii) The adversary observes messages that different processes send [48] . Consider an application where a process does not participate in an instance of consensus until the previous instance (if it exists) has terminated. Suppose in an instance of consensus that n − 1 processes have anonymously broadcast their proposals, which have been delivered to some process, but a process p is still participating in the previous instance of consensus. The adversary can observe this, and can thus de-anonymise p on receipt of its proposal. To cope with these attack vectors, we posit two conditions:
1. The order in which a process delivers a message anonymously broadcast is random among non-faulty processes. This mitigates attacks as in "(i)". 2. After an instance of consensus terminates, a non-faulty process waits on a local timeout for T time before starting the next instance of consensus. T is set such that processes are sufficiently synchronised so that the slowest process terminates after the fastest (non-faulty) process starts the next instance of consensus. This mitigates attacks as in "(ii)".
In practice, satisfying these conditions is feasible. To achieve condition 1, we assume first that messages anonymously broadcast by non-faulty processes are delivered in a random order to each process. By assuming that the time period over which these messages are delivered is sufficiently large (larger than T ), and processes execute anon broadcast in a sufficiently timely manner, condition 1 should with high probability. For condition 2, recall that if a process decides in round r in an instance of binary consensus, then all non-faulty processes will decide by round r + 2. We can use this fact, and measurements of message transmission time, to estimate an appropriate value T .
We remark that under general sequential composition where an instance may only execute after another has terminated, both conditions are required. But, if all instances of AARBP/AVCP are unrelated in the sense that their execution (a process' input, when a process can start execution) does not depend on any other instance, then only condition 1 is required to ensure anonymity. We show that AARBP and AVCP satisfy their respective anonymity definitions in Appendices A and C.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented modular and efficient distributed protocols which allow identified processes to propose values anonymously. In the context of our protocols, we have proposed a model for achieving anonymity. In terms of future work, it is of interest to evaluate anonymity in different formal models [34, 51] and with respect to various practical attack vectors [48] . Further, a reduction to a randomized [14] binary consensus algorithm would remove the dependency on the weak coordinator in the binary consensus algorithm we rely on [20] .
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A Analysis of AARBP
In this appendix, we prove that all properties of anonymous reliable broadcast are fulfilled by our protocol, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) (Algorithm 1 in Section 3).
Remark 1. Let m, n, t be positive integers s.t. n > 3t. We have:
Thus, we refer to " n−t 2 + 1 processes" and "more than n−t 2 processes" interchangeably. Lemma A.1. AARBP ensures AARB-Signing. That is, if a non-faulty process p i AARB-delivers a message, then it must be of the form (m, σ), where a process p i ∈ P invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID, m).
Proof. Suppose p is non-faulty and AARB-delivers a message msg. We aim to show that msg = (m, σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) was called by some process p i . For a non-faulty process to broadcast (ID,READY, msg), they must have either received (ID,READY, msg) from t+1 different processes or (ID,ECHO, msg) from n+t 2 + 1 different processes. Since t + 1 > t, there exists a nonfaulty process p that must have broadcast (ID,READY, msg) on receipt of (ID,ECHO, msg) from n+t 2 +1 different processes to ensure that msg was AARB-delivered to any process. Similarly, since n+t 2 + 1 > t, there exists a non-faulty process p that must have broadcast (ID,ECHO, msg) to ensure (ID,READY, msg) was broadcast by a non-faulty process. Process p must have implicitly checked that msg = (m, σ) and VerifySig(ID, m, σ) = 1 (at line 9). By signature unforgeability, VerifySig(ID, m, σ) = 1 implies that σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) was called by some process p i . Thus, the property holds.
Lemma A.2. AARBP ensures AARB-Anonymity under the assumptions of the model (Section 2) and those made in Section 5. AARB-Anonymity is stated as follows. Let (m, σ) be a tuple anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process p i . Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability P r > 1 n−t .
Proof. Since the adversary A can corrupt up to t processes and has access to and controls their entire state, A can always distinguish between their anonymous proposals. We show that A cannot determine the identity of a signer of remaining n − t proposals with probability greater than randomly guessing.
Let p i denote a non-faulty process that invokes AARBP[ID](m). Process p i invokes Sign(i, ID, m), producing the signature σ (line 6).
Then, p i invokes "anon broadcast (ID,INIT, m, σ)" (line 7). The adversary will eventually see the delivered message at one of its corrupted processes. By signature anonymity, A cannot determine i based on the message alone with probability P r > 1 n−t . By definition of Sign, the adversary cannot produce call σ ← Sign(i, ID, m ) for some m . Thus, by traceability and entrapment-freeness, the adversary cannot produce (m , σ ) such that Trace(ID, m, σ, m , σ ) = "indep". In particular, if m = m, then the adversary cannot expose the identity of p i through a Trace call, as Trace will never output i. Now, the adversary can only see calls of the form "send", "receive" or "anon receive", and cannot see the computational history of non-faulty processes. Importantly, the adversary cannot observe calls that non-faulty processes make to "anon broadcast". By condition 1 in Section 5, the order in which each process controlled by the adversary receives m is randomly distributed among the proposals of all non-faulty processes (each of which anonymously broadcasts). Indeed, the orders of messages received at each corrupted process are pairwise independent, and so the adversary gains no additional information about who anonymously broadcast what. Recall from Section 5 that we distinguish between the case where (i) all instances of AARBP are unrelated, and (ii) executing in a particular instance depends on terminating in another. For case (i), we complete the proof by remarking that messages sent in other instances of AARBP do not reveal additional information to the adversary, since all processes can freely participate in the instance in question. For case (ii), note that condition 2 in Section 5 implies that no non-faulty process is participating in a previous instance of consensus when invoking AARBP. Thus, a non-faulty process cannot be de-anonymised by its progress in that instance. Finally, we note that this property holds in the case that n 3 < t ≤ n − 2.
We also note that, if that a non-faulty process only crashes (and does not recover) after calling anon broadcast, then it cannot be de-anonymised with respect to its proposal. This, however, is beyond the scope of our adversarial model, as a process that crashes is assumed to have been corrupted by the adversary, who can observe its internal state. Proof. Suppose that the non-faulty process p i invokes AARBP with respect to identifier ID and message m. So, p i anonymously broadcasts (ID,INIT, m, σ) , where σ = Sign(i, ID, m) . Since the network is reliable, all non-faulty processes eventually receive (ID,INIT, m, σ) (and indeed all messages broadcast by non-faulty processes). At line 9, VerifySig is queried with respect to (m, σ). By signature correctness, VerifySig(ID, m, σ) = 1 is guaranteed, since p i invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID, m) . So, all non-faulty processes proceed to line 11. By traceability and entrapment-freeness, no nonfaulty process could have received a message (m , σ ) such that Trace(ID, m, σ, m , σ ) = "indep". Consequently, all non-faulty processes reach line 15 with value valid s.t. valid = true. Thus, all non-faulty processes (of which there are at least n−t) reach line 17, broadcasting (ID,ECHO, m, σ). Since n − t > n+t 2 , every non-faulty process will eventually receive more than n+t 2 (ID,ECHO, m, σ) messages, fulfilling the predicate at line 18. More than n+t 2 > t + 1 non-faulty processes will not have broadcast (ID,READY, m, σ), and so will do so (at line 20). Thus, all honest processes will eventually receive t + 1 (ID,READY, m, σ) messages, broadcasting (ID,READY, m, σ) there if not yet done. Then, since n − t ≥ 2t + 1, line 24 will eventually be fulfilled for each non-faulty process. Thus, every non-faulty process will AARB-deliver (m, σ) at line 28, as required. Proof. Let p i be non-faulty. From the protocol specification, p i must have invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID, m). By definition of Sign, no other process could have produced such a value of σ. By traceability and entrapment-freeness, no other process can produce a tuple (m , σ ) such that Trace(ID, m, σ, m , σ ) = "indep". Consequently, no process can produce a message that prevents non-faulty processes from propagating (ID,ECHO, m, σ) messages. Thus, since p i is non-faulty, and therefore followed the protocol, p i must have anonymously broadcast (m, σ).
Remark 2. No non-faulty process will broadcast more than one message of the form (ID,ECHO, m , σ ) where σ is such that σ = Sign(x, ID, m ) for any message m .
Proof. This follows from the proof of Lemma A.3: if non-faulty process p receives another message (m, σ) s.t. σ ← Sign(x, ID, m) for any m, then Trace(ID, m, σ, m , σ ) = "indep", and so p will not reach line 17. Proof. For p i (resp. p j ) to have AARB-delivered (m, σ) (resp. (m , σ )), p i (resp. p j ) must have broadcast (ID,READY, m, σ) (resp. (ID,READY, m , σ ) ). Then, one of two predicates (at lines 18 and 21) must have been true for each process. That is, p i (resp. p j ) must have received either: We first prove the following claim: if (ID,READY, m, σ) is broadcast by p i , and (ID,READY, m , σ ) is broadcast by p j , then (m, σ) = (m , σ ). Suppose that both processes fulfill condition (1), receiving ECHO messages from sets of processes P and P respectively, where p i broadcasts (ID,READY, m, σ) and p j broadcasts (ID,READY, m , σ ). Assume that (m, σ) = (m , σ ). Then:
Therefore, P ∩ P must contain at least one correct process, say p c . By Remark 2, p c must have sent the same ECHO message for some message to both processes, and so p i and p j must have received the same message (ID,ECHO, m, σ) = (ID,ECHO, m , σ ), contradicting the assumption that (m, σ) = (m , σ ). Thus, they must broadcast the same READY message. Suppose now that at least one process broadcasts READY due to condition (2) being fulfilled. Without loss of generality, assume exactly one process p broadcasts READY on this basis. Then, p must have received a READY message from at least one correct process (since out of t+1 processes, at least 1 must be non-faulty), say p a . Either p a received READY from at least one correct process, say p b , or it satisfied condition (1). By continuing the logic (and since |P | is finite), there must exist a process p (1) that fulfilled condition (1). Then, by the correctness of processes p (1) , . . . , p b , p a , READY messages sent by p i and p j must be the same, completing the proof.
Therefore, p i broadcasting (ID,READY, m, σ), and p j broadcasting (ID,READY, m , σ ) implies (m, σ) = (m , σ ) given that p i and p j are non-faulty.
We now directly prove the lemma. If p i AARB-delivers (m, σ), it received (ID,READY, m, σ) from (2t + 1) different processes, and thus received (ID,READY, m, σ) from at least one non-faulty process. Similarly, if p j AARB-delivers (m , σ ), it must have received (ID,READY, m , σ ) from at least one non-faulty process. It follows from the previous claim that all non-faulty processes broadcast the same READY message. Thus, p i and p j AARB-deliver the same tuple. Lemma A.6. AARBP ensures AARB-Termination-2. That is, if a non-faulty process AARBdelivers (m, σ), then all the non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m, σ).
Proof. By Lemma A.5, all non-faulty processes that AARB-deliver a message (m , σ ) s.t. σ ← Sign(x, ID, m ) AARB-deliver (m, σ). Then, p i must have received the message (ID,READY, m, σ) from (2t + 1) processes (line 24), at least t + 1 of which must be non-faulty. These t + 1 processes must have broadcast (ID,READY, m, σ) (at line 20 or 23), and so every non-faulty process will eventually receive (t + 1) (ID,READY, m, σ) messages, and thus broadcast (ID,READY, m, σ) at some point. Given there are n − t ≥ 2t + 1 non-faulty processes, each non-faulty process eventually receives (ID,READY, m, σ) from at least 2t + 1 processes. Therefore, every non-faulty process will AARB-deliver (m, σ).
Lemma A.7. AARBP ensures AARB-Unicity, which is stated as follows. Consider any point of time in which a non-faulty process p has AARB-delivered more than one tuple. Let delivered = {(m 1 , σ 1 ), · · · , (m k , σ k )}, where |delivered| = k, denote the set of these tuples. For each i ∈ {1..k}, let out i = FindIndex(ID, m i , σ i ) denote the output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then for all distinct pairs of tuples {(m i , σ i ), (m j , σ j )}, out i = out j . Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose that p AARB-delivers two tuples (m, σ) and (m , σ ) such that FindIndex(ID, m, σ) = FindIndex(ID, m , σ ). Then, AARB-Termination-2 implies that all non-faulty processes will eventually AARB-deliver (m, σ) and (m , σ ). But, Lemma A.5 asserts that FindIndex(ID, m, σ) = FindIndex(ID, m , σ ), a contradiction. Thus, for each i ∈ {1..n}, p AARB-delivers at most one tuple (m, σ) such that FindIndex(ID, m, σ) = i. 
B Binary consensus and BV-broadcast
We first recall the definitions that define the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC) problem as stated in [20] . We assume that every non-faulty process proposes a value, and remark that only the values in the set {0, 1} can be decided by a non-faulty process.
• BBC-Termination: Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement: No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity: If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be decided.
We present the safe, non-terminating variant of the binary consensus routine from [20] . We also present the relevant components of the terminating variant that require handling in AVCP, and describe how to ensure termination. As assumed in the model (Section 2), the terminating routine relies on partial synchrony between processes in P . The protocols execute in asynchronous rounds.
State. A process keeps track of a binary value est ∈ {0, 1}, a process' current estimate of the decided value, arrays bin values[1..], a round number r (initialised to 0), an auxiliary binary value b, and an auxiliary set of (binary) values values that is initially empty. BV-broadcast. To exchange EST messages, the protocol relies on an all-to-all communication abstraction, BV-broadcast [43] , which satisfies the following properties for a given round r ≥ 1 that a process is executing:
Messages. Messages of the form (EST,
• BV-Obligation: If at least (t + 1) non-faulty processes BV-broadcast the same value v, then v will eventually be added to the set bin values of each non-faulty process.
• BV-Justification: If p is non-faulty and v ∈ bin values[r], then v must have been BVbroadcast by a non-faulty process.
• BV-Uniformity: If v is added to a non-faulty process p's bin values[r] set, then eventually v ∈ bin values[r] at every non-faulty process.
• BV-Termination: Eventually, bin values[r] becomes non-empty for every non-faulty process.
Primarily, BV-broadcast serves to filter values that are only proposed by faulty processes (BVObligation, BV-Justification), to ensure progress (BV-Termination), and to work towards agreement (BV-Uniformity).
Functions. Let b ∈ {0, 1}. In addition to BV-broadcast and the communication primitives in our model (Section 2), a process can invoke bin propose(b) to begin executing an instance of binary consensus with input b, and decide(b) to decide the value b. In a given instance of binary consensus, these two functions may be called exactly once. Protocol description. Upon the invocation bin propose(b), where b ∈ {0, 1}, a process will enter a sequence of asynchronous rounds.
In a given round, a process will invoke BV-broadcast (line 5), broadcasting its current estimate (line 17) for the round r, which is est. In an instance of BV-broadcast, after receiving a binary value from t + 1 different processes, a process will broadcast the value if not yet done (line 19). Eventually, a process will BV-deliver a value v upon reception from 2t + 1 different processes, fulfilling the condition at line 21. In doing so, a process will append v to its set bin values[r] (line 22), and we note that bin values[r] is not necessarily in its final form at this point in time.
Since bin values[r] is now a singleton set (after line 6), non-faulty processes will broadcast the value v contained in bin values[r] (line 7). Then, processes wait until they can form a set values s.t. values ⊆ bin values and values is formed from at least n − t (AUX, r, b) messages received (line 8). This ensures that enough processes have sent messages to be able to (potentially) decide, and that only values BV-broadcast previously are considered candidates for being decided.
Then, processes attempt to decide a value via local computation. b is set to r (mod 2) (line 9), and then each process checks the following:
• If values = {v} is singleton, the estimate for the next round is set to v (line 11).
• Given values is singleton, v is then decided if r (mod 2) = v, (lines 12 and 13). If this does not hold, the value can be decided in the next round provided that values is a singleton at line 11.
• Else, values contains 2 values, and est is set to be r (mod 2) (line 15), as a process cannot decide at this point.
Note that, upon invocation of decide(), processes still participate in the protocol, enabling other processes who may not have decided to decide. The interested reader may verify the correctness of this protocol, and the corresponding terminating, partially-synchronous protocol in [20] . This broadcast call can be handled exactly as in the logic beginning at lines 17 and 24 of the handler (Algorithm 3), provided that for a given round r, the coordinator is common across all n instances of consensus. No other communication steps are added in the terminating algorithm.
In the non-terminating binary consensus algorithm, a process executes indefinitely after invoking decide(). The terminating variant, by contrast, imposes certain conditions upon termination, which are checked at the end of each round r. In the context of the following algorithm excerpt, a process that invokes the instruction halt discontinues executing instructions in the binary consensus instance that halt was called in, and drops all related messages. if decide() invoked in round r − 2 then halt It is shown in [20] that, given that some non-faulty process decides in round r, all non-faulty processes will decide by round r + 2. Note that a process may invoke decide() in different rounds in different instances of binary consensus. Thus, a process may invoke halt in some, but not all, instances of binary consensus. Suppose that a process has invoked halt in k instances of binary consensus, where 1 < k < n, in some round r. Then, broadcasting a message with header EST ONES in the handler (Algorithm 3), say, will be impossible, since counts [EST] [r] will never be incremented to n.
To cope with this problem, we define a new termination condition. Let r max be the largest round number of the n instances of binary consensus that a given process decides in. Then, that process can invoke halt at the end of round r max + 2.
C Analysis of AVCP
In this appendix, we prove that the properties of anonymous proposer vector consensus (AVC), presented in Section 4, are satisfied by our protocol Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP) (Algorithms 2 and 3).
Lemma C.1. In AVCP, for each identifier ID, a non-faulty process' data structure "labelled []" is such that |labelled .values()| ≤ n. Further, no two binary consensus instances are labelled by the same value l.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, recall that an instance inst is only moved to labelled at line 9 upon AARB-delivery of (m, σ). By AARB-Unicity, a non-faulty process will AARB-deliver at most one tuple (m, σ) for every process p i s.t. σ ← Sign(i, ID, m). Since |P | = n, at most n instances inst will thus be moved to labelled .
For the second part of the lemma, recall that we assume signature uniqueness. Thus, every tuple (m, σ) anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process is unique. Moreover, any duplicate tuple (m, σ), even if broadcast by a faulty process, cannot be AARB-delivered twice (checked at line 25). Thus, by the collision-resistance of H, H(m || σ) = H(m || σ ) for any two distinct tuples (m, σ) and (m , σ ) that are AARB-delivered. Since each instance is labelled by H(m || σ ) for some tuple (m, σ), it follows that no two instances will conflict in label.
Lemma C.2. Consider AVCP. Let p be a non-faulty process. Then, given that the "for" loop on lines 38 and 39 is executed as an atomic operation, all instances in unlabelled .values() will contain the same set of messages.
Proof. At the protocol's outset, all instances of binary consensus are in labelled , where no messages have been received. The only place that messages are deposited to unlabelled instances is at lines 38 and 39, where messages are deposited into all members of unlabelled . Finally, note that instances can only moved out of unlabelled , which occurs at line 9.
Lemma C.3. In AVCP, a non-faulty process p sends a message of the form (ID,TAG, r, label , b), then there locally exists an instance of binary consensus inst such that labelled [label ] = inst.
Proof. Suppose p sends (ID,EST, r, label , b). If b = 1, then one of three scenarios holds: (i) r = 1 and p has invoked inst.bin propose(1) where labelled [label ] = inst, (ii) r ≥ 1, p has received t + 1 messages of the form (ID,EST, r, label , b) and has not yet broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b), or (iii) their value est was set to b = 1 at the end of the previous round of binary consensus. In case (i), note that bin propose(1) (at line 12) is executed after inst is labelled (at line 9). Note that in both cases (ii) and (iii), p must have processed messages of the form (ID,EST, r, label , 1). As described in the text, these messages are only processed after the AARB-delivery of the corresponding message (m, σ) where label = H(m || σ) and some instance inst is labelled by label (at line 9). If b = 0, only case (ii) needs to be considered, since the other broadcast call is handled by the handler (Algorithm 3). Here, b = 1 must have been initially broadcast, which is described by cases (i) and (iii). Suppose p sends (ID,AUX, r, label , b). Note that b = 0, since the handler handles this case. Thus, we consider b = 1. b must have been BV-delivered (line 6 of Algorithm 4), requiring p to have processed messages of the form (ID,EST, r, label , b) , which requires some instance to be labelled by label to do. This exhausts the possibilities.
Lemma C.4. Consider AVCP. Let r ≥ 1 be an integer. Then, all messages sent by nonfaulty processes of the form (ID,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1}, and (ID,TAG, r, ones) where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES} and b ∈ {0, 1}, are eventually deposited into the corresponding binary consensus instances of a non-faulty process.
Proof. Let p be the recipient of a message in the above forms. We first consider messages of the form (ID,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1}. By Lemma C.3, the nonfaulty sender of such a message must have AARB-delivered some message (m, σ) such that label = H(m || σ). By AARB-Termination-2, p will eventually AARB-deliver (m, σ) and subsequently label an instance of binary consensus which is uniquely defined by label (Lemma C.1). Thus, p will eventually process (ID,TAG, r, label , b) in instance inst = labelled [label ] . Consider messages of the form (ID,TAG, r, ones) where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES} and b ∈ {0, 1}. Since the sender is non-faulty, every element of ones (i.e. every label) must correspond to a message that was AARB-delivered by the sender. By AARB-Termination-2, p will eventually AARB-deliver these messages, label instances of binary consensus (at line 9) and thus progress beyond line 32. Thus, p will deposit 0 in all instances not labelled by elements of ones (at lines 37 and 39), which is the prescribed behaviour.
Lemma C.5. In AVCP, every non-faulty process reaches line 5, i.e. decides 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus.
Proof. Given at most t faulty processes, at least n − t non-faulty processes invoke AARBP at line 2, broadcasting a value that satisfies valid() by assumption. By AARB-Termination-1, every message anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process is eventually AARB-delivered by all nonfaulty processes. Suppose a non-faulty process p labels an instance of consensus inst by one of these messages. By Lemma C.4, all messages sent by non-faulty processes associated with inst are eventually processed by p. Then, all non-faulty processes will invoke bin propose(1) in at least n − t instances of binary consensus (i.e. while blocked at line 3). Consider the first n − t instances of consensus for which a decision is made at. By the intrusion tolerance of binary consensus, no coalition of faulty processes can force 0 to be a valid value in these consensus instances, since all nonfaulty processes must invoke bin propose(1) in them. Then, by BBC-Agreement, BBC-Validity and BBC-Termination, all non-faulty processes will eventually decide 1 in n − t BIN CONS instances. Thus, all non-faulty processes eventually reach line 5.
We now prove that AVC-Validity holds.
Theorem C.1. AVCP satisfies AVC-Validity, which is stated as follows. Consider each non-faulty process. Each value v ∈ V that is decided must satisfy valid(), and |V | ≥ n − t. Further, at least |V | − t values correspond to the proposals of distinct non-faulty processes.
Proof. Let p be a non-faulty process. By construction of the binary consensus algorithm, p must process messages of the form (ID,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1} to reach a decision. By Lemma C.4, p must have AARB-delivered the corresponding message (m, σ) such that label = H(m || σ) before deciding. That is, proposals must have been populated with the corresponding message (m, σ) at line 11, and valid() must be true for (m, σ), checked previously at line 10. By Lemma C.5, p eventually decides 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus. Upon each decision, the corresponding message is added to V = decided ones (at line 15). For the latter component of the definition, we note that ARB-Unicity ensures that each value in V contains a signature produced by a different process. So, given V is decided, at most t of the corresponding signatures could have been produced by faulty processes.
Lemma C.6. Consider AVCP. Fix r ≥ 1. Given that a non-faulty process p invokes "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" or "broadcast (ID,AUX, r, label , b)" in all n instances of binary consensus, then all non-faulty processes interpret the corresponding messages sent by p as if p were executing the original binary consensus algorithm.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose p invokes "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" in all n instances of binary consensus. For every instance inst such that b = 1, p broadcasts (ID,EST, r, label , b) (at line 19) which is identical to the behaviour in the original algorithm. Proof. Consider a non-faulty process p. By Lemma C.5, p reaches line 5 with n − t values in their local array decided ones. At this point, p invokes bin propose(0) in all other instances of binary consensus. Since all n instances are thus executed, p will eventually invoke "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" in all n instances of binary consensus. By Lemma C.6, non-faulty processes interpret p's corresponding messages as if p were executing the original binary consensus algorithm. Similarly, p will eventually invoke "broadcast (ID,AUX, r, label , b)" in all n instances.
Note that DBFT [20] is guaranteed termination with n instances of binary consensus as each instance is guaranteed to terminate due to BBC-Termination. It remains to show that AVCP preserves BBC-Termination for all n instances of consensus. Lemma 11 in [20] states that, at some point after which the global stabilistation time (GST) is reached, any execution of the original binary consensus routine eventually executes in synchronous steps. Note that in our construction, the slowest binary consensus instance is no slower than if n instances of the original binary consensus routine were executing. For example, in AVCP, a message of the form (EST ONES , r, ones) is sent after n invocations of "broadcast (ID,EST, r, label , b)" are performed for a given r. Then, Lemma C.6 implies that messages sent by non-faulty processes remain unchanged as in an execution of n instances of the original binary consensus routine. Thus, Lemma 11 holds for the slowest instance of consensus. Since all other instances are faster, they too are synchronised, and so Lemma 11 holds for them also. By Lemma 9 in [20] , which asserts that BBC-Termination holds for an instance of binary consensus, it follows that each non-faulty process will decide a value in the n instances of consensus in AVCP. At this point, p immediately returns decided ones (at line 7). Since p was arbitrary (but non-faulty), it follows that AVC-Termination holds. Theorem C.3. AVCP ensures AVC-Agreement. That is, all non-faulty processes that decide output the same vector V .
Proof. Consider two non-faulty processes, p i and p j that have decided (AVC-Termination). Suppose that p i has decided decided ones. Each value in decided ones must have been AARB-delivered to p i in order to decide 1 in the corresponding instances of binary consensus (Lemma C.3). By AARB-Unicity and AARB-Termination-2, p j will AARB-deliver all values in decided ones. By Lemma C.5, all non-faulty processes eventually decide 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus. Consequently, p i and p j participate in all n instances of binary consensus which by Lemma C.6 is equivalent to participating in n instances of binary consensus as per the original algorithm. Then, by BBC-Agreement, p j decides 1 in an instance of binary consensus if and only if p i decides 1 in that instance. Consequently, each corresponding value, which have all been AARB-delivered prior to deciding 1 in each instance of binary consensus (Lemma C.3) will be added to p j 's local array decided ones . Thus, decided ones = decided ones.
Theorem C.4. AVCP ensures AVC-Anonymity under the assumptions of our model (Section 2) and the three conditions described in Section 5. AVC-Anonymity is stated as follows: Suppose that m is proposed by a non-faulty process p i . Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability P r > 1 n−t . Proof. We note that each process invokes AARBP at the beginning of any execution of AVCP. So, the proof of AVC-Anonymity follows directly from the proof of AARB-Anonymity (Lemma A.2).
D Composing threshold encryption and AVCP
Threshold encryption involves a set of processes who have a common encryption key, and an individual share of the decryption key. A k-out-of-n threshold encryption scheme requires the joint collaboration of k processes to decrypt any encrypted value. Importantly, k − 1 or less processes are unable to determine any additional information about a given encrypted value in collaboration. The keying material can be reused in the sense that many values can be decrypted without compromising the security of the scheme.
AVCP assumes that up to t processes may be Byzantine faulty. Thus, by setting the decryption threshold to t+1, a coalition of t malicious processes are unable to deduce the contents of encrypted values until a non-faulty process initiates threshold decryption. Consequently, a protocol that ensures that the contents of all non-faulty process' proposals to an instance of AVCP is not revealed until after termination can be designed as follows:
1. All processes encrypt their proposal under a pre-determined public key.
2. All processes invoke AVCP with input as their encrypted value.
3. Upon termination, all processes initiate threshold decryption.
D.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the assumptions made by AVCP, including those made in our model (Section 2), hold true. In particular, the dealer generates the initial state, including the values of n and t. As such, the decryption threshold for the instance of threshold encryption is set to k = t + 1. We assume that the distributed oracle also handles queries of the following functions:
1. c ← Enc(ID, m), which takes identifier ID ∈ {0, 1} * and message m ∈ {0, 1} * as input, and outputs the ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} * . All parties (even those not in P ) may query Enc.
2. b ← VerifyEnc(ID, c), which takes identifier ID and ciphertext c as input, and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. All parties may query VerifyEnc.
3. σ ← ShareGen(i, ID, c), which takes integer i ∈ {1..n}, identifier ID and ciphertext c as input, and outputs the decryption share σ ∈ {0, 1} * . We restrict the interface ShareGen such that only process p i ∈ P may invoke ShareGen with first argument i.
4. b ← VerifyShare(ID, c, σ), which takes identifier ID, ciphertext c and decryption share σ as input, and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. All parties may query VerifyShare.
5. m ← Dec(ID, c, Σ), which takes the identifier ID, ciphertext c and set Σ = {σ 1 , . . . , σ k } of k decryption shares, and outputs the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} * . All parties may query Dec.
These definitions are inspired by those used in defining Shoup and Gennaro's non-interactive threshold encryption scheme [53] . The behaviour of calls to the above functions satisfies the following properties:
• Encryption correctness and non-malleability: VerifyEnc(ID, c) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists a party which previously invoked Enc(ID, m) and obtained c as a response. Non-malleability is captured by the "⇒" claim, which ensures that any correct encryption was produced by a call to Enc. In particular, non-malleability implies that combining any value and an encryption will not produce another valid encryption.
• Share correctness and unforgeability: VerifyShare(ID, c, σ) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists process p i ∈ P that previously invoked ShareGen(i, ID, c) and obtained σ as a result.
• Decryption correctness and decryption security: Dec(ID, c, Σ) = m, where m was the input to a previous call to Enc(ID, m) ⇐⇒ the following conditions are met:
1. c ← Enc(ID, m) was called by some party.
2. Σ = {σ 1 , . . . , σ k } (|Σ| = k), where for each distinct pair σ i , σ j ∈ Σ, distinct processes p i , p j ∈ P (i = j) respectively called σ i ← ShareGen(i, ID, c) and σ j ← ShareGen(j, ID, c).
The "⇐" claim captures decryption correctness. The "⇒" claim captures security, ensuring that k valid shares produced by distinct processes are required for decryption.
• 
D.2 Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE)
At a high level, processes first perform AVCP with respect to their proposal which is encrypted under the threshold encryption scheme. Then, processes perform threshold decryption, which requires an additional message delay for termination. We call this algorithm an Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE), since processes can propose arbitrary values and are ensured of certain properties that are defined in the context of electronic voting. We describe and prove these hold in the next subsection.
Functions. Each process has access to the distributed oracle and in addition to all functions invoked AVCP (Section 4). For a given tuple (m, σ) we assume that the predicate valid() in AVCP returns true only if VerifyEnc(ID, m) = 1. That is, m was the result of a query to Enc(ID, msg) for some msg ∈ {0, 1} * .
State. Each process tracks the variables ID, a string uniquely identifying an instance of ABE, hasbroadcast, a Boolean that is initially false, unique-encs and plaintexts, sets of messages m ∈ {0, 1} * that are initially empty, and partial-decs, which maps ciphertexts to sets of decryption shares, each of which are initially empty.
Messages. In addition to messages propagated in AVCP (which includes messages from AARBP), messages of the form (DECS, ID, encs) are propagated, where encs is a map, each value of which is a singleton set.
Algorithm 7 Arbitrary ballot election (ABE)
c ← Enc(ID, m)
3:
unique-encs ← unique-encs ∪ {m 1 }
6:
return decryption(unique-encs)
7: decryption(encs): 8:
for each c in encs do broadcast (DECS, ID, partial-decs)
12:
has-broadcast ← true 13: upon receipt of (DECS, ID, decs )
14:
if (partial-decs.keys() = decs .keys()) ∧ (VerifyShare(ID, c, decs [c]) = 1 for all c ∈ decs .keys()) then
15:
wait until has-broadcast = true return plaintexts Protocol description. Each process begins with the plaintext m to propose to consensus. Processes encrypt m under Enc, producing the ciphertext c (line 2). Processes propose their encrypted value to an instance of AVCP identified by ID. Since valid() checks that VerifyEnc(ID, m) = 1 for a given tuple (m, σ), encs will thus contain well-formed encryptions (AVC-Validity) of processes' proposals. Now, AVCP guarantees that signatures, rather than the contents of messages, are unique. So, it is conceivable that a process will mount a replay attack, which aims to disrupt an election by mimicking the input of some process. Since values are encrypted under a common instantiation of threshold encryption, it is desirable to prevent this attack. Consequently, we require that non-faulty processes prepend a sufficiently large sequence of random bits to their plaintext. For simplicity, we assume that each sequence that a non-faulty proposes derives is unique. So, non-unique encrypted messages are discarded (lines 4 and 5), resulting in the set unique-encs. At this point, threshold decryption is performed with respect to each element of unique-encs (line 6). For each (encrypted) value that a process decided, a decryption share is produced. Then, processes broadcast each share and the corresponding ciphertext used to produce it.
Processes do not process shares that they have received from other processes until they have broadcast their shares, ensuring termination for all non-faulty processes. In practice, processes can process shares provided they delay termination until after they have broadcast. Upon receipt of a (potential) set of shares, processes check that the ciphertexts received match theirs. Given this holds, they check that all shares are well-formed. At this point, processes store these shares in encs. Once a process has received k shares for every ciphertext in unique-encs, each ciphertext is decrypted, and the resulting plaintexts are returned.
D.3 Analysis
We prove a number of properties hold:
Lemma D.1. ABE satisfies termination. That is, all non-faulty processes eventually complete protocol execution.
Proof. At the protocol's outset, all non-faulty processes produce a value c s.t. c ← Enc(ID, m) was called for some m ∈ {0, 1} (line 2). Then, processes execute AVCP with respect to the identifier ID, where every non-faulty process proposes a valid ciphertext c (line 3). On AARB-delivery of each value, a process' call to valid() will return true by encryption correctness, as it must be the case VerifyEnc(ID, c) = 1 for such a c. By AVC-Termination, AVC-Validity and AVC-Agreement, all non-faulty processes eventually terminate AVCP with the same set of values, each of which satisfies valid(). By AVC-Agreement, all non-faulty processes will obtain the same set unique-encs (after line 5). Then, all non-faulty processes will produce decryption shares for each value in unique-encs via calls to ShareGen, which are guaranteed to be broadcast as no non-faulty process can terminate until the condition at line 15 is fulfilled. On receipt of a set of decryption shares (line 13) (with identical corresponding ciphertexts) from a non-faulty process, by share correctness each share σ will satisfy VerifyShare(ID, c, σ) = 1 for the corresponding ciphertext c. Thus, a non-faulty process will eventually receive k = t + 1 valid decryption shares for each unique value that was decided by AVCP. Thus, they can call Dec with respect to each set of shares (line 20) which by decryption correctness will pass, and thus the process will return the corresponding plaintexts.
Comparable definitions to anonymous vector consensus (Section 4) regarding agreement, validity and anonymity follow straightforwardly from the fact that AVCP satisfies AVC-Agreement, AVCValidity and AVC-Anonymity, respectively. Lemma D.2. ABE satisfies public verifiability. That is, any third party can obtain the result of the election after termination.
Proof. By termination and agreement, all non-faulty processes eventually agree on the same set of plaintext values. Then, a third party can request these values from all processes. On receipt of t + 1 identical sets of values, the third party can deduce that the set of values corresponds to the election result. Lemma D.3. ABE satisfies weak privacy. That is, a value proposed by a non-faulty process is only revealed after AVCP has terminated for a non-faulty process.
Proof. Each non-faulty process p proposes a value c s.t. c ← Enc(ID, m) was invoked for some m ∈ {0, 1} * (line 2). Encryption hiding implies that m can only be revealed if either p reveals m, which p does not in the protocol, or if a valid call to Dec is made. By decryption security, Dec will only return m if provided k = t + 1 valid decryption shares. Now, no non-faulty process broadcasts a decryption share until after it terminates AVCP. Thus, a coalition of t faulty processes cannot decrypt m via Dec, which is the only conceivable way for them to obtain m in the model. Lemma D.4. ABE satisfies eligibility. That is, only processes in P may propose a ballot that is decided.
Proof. By assumption, non-faulty processes only process messages sent over regular channels from processes in P . But, any party may anonymously broadcast a value v. AARBP satisfies AVCSigning. That is, all AARB-delivered messages are of the form (m, σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID, m). By assumption on the interface of Sign, only a process in P may call Sign. By construction of AVCP, only messages that are AARB-delivered are decided by non-faulty processes. Thus, no non-faulty process will decide a value v in AVCP from any party outside of P .
Lemma D.5. ABE satisfies non-reusability. That is, at most one encrypted ballot signed by a particular process can be decided in the election.
Proof. By construction of AVCP, only messages that are AARB-delivered are decided by non-faulty processes. By AARB-Unicity, no non-faulty process will AARB-deliver more than one tuple (m, σ) such that a process p i invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID, m).
E Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results of our implementations of cryptographic and distributed protocols. To determine their influence in cost over our distributed protocols, we benchmark two cryptographic protocols which our distributed protocols rely on, namely Fujisaki's traceable ring signature (TRS) scheme [29] and Shoup and Gennaro's threshold encryption scheme [53] . With this information, we then benchmark and evaluate our three distributed protocols: Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP), Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP), and our election scheme, Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE).
E.1 Cryptography
Benchmarks of standalone cryptographic constructions were performed on a laptop with an Intel i5-7200U (quad-core) processor clocked at 3.1GHz and 8GB of memory. The operating system used was Ubuntu 18.04. Each cryptosystem was implemented in golang. All cryptographic schemes were implemented using Curve25519 [7] . To simulate a prime-order group we use the Ristretto technique [1], derived from the Decaf approach [35] , via go-ristretto 1 . All cryptographic operations rely on constant-time arithmetic operations to prevent side-channel attacks [12] . Each data point represents a minimum of 100 and a maximum of 10000 iterations.
E.1.1 Ring signatures
To confirm that the implementation is competitive, we compare it to an implementation of Lui et al.'s linkable ring signature scheme [40] . The particular implementation we compare to was produced by EPFL's DEDIS group as part of kyber 2 . We note that the ring signature schemes naturally lend themselves towards parallelism. To this end, we provide an extension of our TRS implementation that takes advantage of concurrency.
We compared the two major operations. Firstly, the Sign() operation ("Sign" in Section 2) is that which forms a ring signature. Secondly, Verify() ("VerifySig" in Section 2) takes a ring signature as input, and verifies the well-formedness of the signature, and (in implementation) outputs a tag which is used for linking/tracing. Figure 1a represents the normalised speedup, as a percentage, afforded to the Sign() and Verify() operations in the TRS scheme. We note that Figure 1a involves purely sequential implementations. We vary n, the size of the ring. Performance of Sign() and Verify() in both schemes scales linearly with respect to n.
Let T LRS be the time an operation (signing or verification) takes in the TRS implementation, and similarly define T T RS . Then, normalised speedup is given by:
Indeed, this value hovers above 70 percent for all values of n tested. In the LRS implementation, the Sign() operation took between 7.5 and 230.4ms to execute (for values n = 10 and n = 310 respectively). Sign() in the TRS implementation took between 4.3 and 132.0ms to execute. Similarly, Verify() took between 7.7 and 230.3ms to execute in the LRS implementation, and took between 4.4 and 134.6ms to execute in the TRS implementation.
To understand the performance increase, we count cryptographic operations. We use the notation presented in [58], adapted to represent elliptic curve operations. Let E denote the cost of performing point multiplication, and M denote the number of operations of the form (aP + bQ), where a, b are scalars, and P, Q are points. Then, in the LRS scheme, Sign() requires 2(n−1)M +3E operations, and Verify() requires 2nM operations [58] . In the TRS scheme, Sign() requires the same 2(n − 1)M and 3E operations, in addition to nM other operations. Similarly, the TRS Verify() call requires 2nM + nM = 3nM operations. With the same elliptic curve implementation, we should see a performance increase from an efficient LRS implementation, as the TRS scheme requires 1.5x M operations by comparison to the LRS scheme. But, in the library we use for ECC, go-ristretto, base point multiplication is 2.8x faster, point multiplication is 2.3x faster, and point addition is 2.6x faster. Thus, we see an overall increase in performance in our TRS implementation by comparison.
Recall that in AARBP (and thus AVCP), ring signature tracing is performed iteratively. Suppose that some process has x correct ring signatures that they have verified at some point in time. Then, upon receipt of another signature, they first execute Verify(), and then perform the Trace() operation between the new signature and each of the x stored signatures. To model this behaviour, we perform a benchmark where signatures are processed one-by-one with a ring of size n that is varied from 20 to 100 in increments of 20. As the linkable ring signature scheme admits very similar functionality, except it performs a linking operation, rather than a tracing operation, we benchmark similarly. Figure 1b compares the average time taken to perform the aforementioned procedure, between a sequential implementation of the TRS scheme, the corresponding concurrent implementation (utilising four cores), and the (sequential) LRS implementation. Now, the time taken to perform Verify() is proportional to the size of the ring n. In addition, we perform more (n) Verify() operations as we increase n. Consequently, execution time grows quadratically in Figure 1b for each implementation. In addition to the previously outlined speedup, we roughly halve execution time of TRS operations by exploiting concurrency in our implementation. With n = 100, our concurrent implementation is 2.25x faster than our sequential implementation, and is 3.86x faster than the sequential LRS implementation.
To perform Trace() between two signatures, O(n) comparisons are performed in a naive implementation, whereas a single comparison is need to link in the TRS scheme. In implementation, we used a hash table, so each new signature required O(n) lookups in the TRS scheme, and one lookup in the LRS scheme. As expected, we observe that the increased overhead of tracing is dominated by the time taken performing Verify() operations, and so speedup does not appear to be affected.
E.1.2 Threshold encryption
Our arbitrary ballot voting scheme, ABE, presented in Appendix D, can be instantiated with Shoup and Gennaro's threshold encryption scheme [53] . To this end, we present results corresponding to our implementation of their construction. Table 2 shows the performance of all operations in the threshold encryption scheme [53] as executed by one process, bar decryption itself. As can be seen, all operations can be executed in a reasonable amount of time (less than a millisecond). In our electronic voting protocol, each process performs a single encryption operation, but may perform O(n) operations of the other forms over the protocol's execution. Even when n is relatively large (> 100), we can expect to see acceptable levels of performance.
Let P be a group of n processes. Then, the final operation, share combination, combines a group of k valid decryption shares, where k is the threshold required to reconstruct the secret. In our electronic voting protocols, for interoperability with our consensus algorithms, we set k = t + 1, where t is, at most, the largest value such that t < Figure 2 represents the time taken to decrypt a message, varying k, the number of shares needed to reconstruct the message in increments of 10. As some steps of the reconstruction process can be performed concurrently, e.g. in the derivation of Lagrange coefficients [52], we provide an extension that takes advantage of a multi-core processor. To this end, Figure 2 graphs the time taken to perform share combination with both our sequential implementation, and the corresponding concurrent implementation utilising two to four cores.
Indeed, producing Lagrange coefficients requires a quadratic amount of work (with respect to k), and subsequently decrypting a message takes O(k) effort, which dominates execution time. Both the quadratic and linear components of the share combination can be made concurrent. Consequently, we roughly double our performance with two to four cores running. It is worth noting that the effort required to spawn additional threads in the three and four core case does not translate to a very noticeable improvement in performance for our values of k.
E.2 Distributed protocols
Benchmarks of distributed protocols were performed using Amazon EC2 instances. We refer to each EC2 instance used as a node, corresponding to a process in protocol descriptions. For each value of n (the number of nodes) chosen, we ran experiments with an equal number of nodes from four regions: Oregon (us-west-2), Ohio (us-east-2), Singapore (ap-southeast-1) and Frankfurt (eu-central-1). The type of instance chosen was c4.xlarge, which provide 7.5GiB of memory, and 4 vCPUs, i.e. 4 cores of an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 processor. We performed between 50 and 60 iterations for each value of n and t benchmarked. We vary n incrementally, and vary t both with respect to the maximum fault-tolerance (i.e. t = n−1 3 ), and also fix t = 6 for values of n = 20, 40, . . . As such, we evaluate the effect of varying both n and t. All networking code, and the application logic, was written in Python (2.7). As we have implemented our cryptosystems in golang, we call our libraries from Python using ctypes 3 . To simulate reliable channels, nodes communicate over TCP. Nodes begin timing once all connections have been established (i.e. all handshakes have been performed).
E.2.1 Anonymous proposer vector consensus
Our protocol, Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP), was implemented on top of the existing DBFT [20] codebase, as was the case with AARBP. With respect to optimisations, we make use of the aforementioned hashing optimisation in both AARBP and RB-broadcast (which are primitives in AVCP and DBFT respectively), but do not make use of the fast-path optimisation described in Section 4. Figure 3a compares the performance of AARBP with that of AVCP. In general, convergence time for AVCP is higher as we need at least three more message steps for a process to decide. Given that the fast-path optimisation is used, requiring 1 additional message step over AARBP in the good case, the difference in performance between AVCP and AARBP would indeed be smaller.
Comparing AVCP with t = max and t = 6, we see that when t = 6, convergence is slower. Indeed, AVC-Validity states at least n − t values fulfilling valid() are included in a process' vector given that they decide. Consequently, as t is smaller, n − t is larger, and so nodes will process and decide more values. Although ARB-delivery may be faster for some messages, nodes generally have to perform more TRS verification/tracing operations. As nodes decide 1 in more instances of binary consensus, messages of the form (MSG, 0, r, S = {s 1 , · · · }) are propagated where |S| is generally larger, slowing down decision time primarily due to size of the message. We conjecture that nodes having to ARB-deliver all values in S before processing such a message does not slow down performance, as all nodes are non-faulty in our experiments. Figure 3b compares the performance of DBFT as a vector consensus vector routine with AVCP. Indeed, the difference in performance between AVCP and DBFT when n = 20 and n = 40 is primarily due to AVCP's 750ms timeout. As expected when scaling n, cryptographic operations result in worse scaling characteristics for AVCP. As can be seen, DBFT performs relatively well. However, DBFT does not leverage anonymous channels, nor relies on ring signatures, and so AVCP's comparatively slow performance was expected. It is reassuring that AVCP's performance does not differ by an order of magnitude from that of DBFT, given AVCP provides anonymity guarantees.
Overall, AVCP performs reasonably well. Interestingly, AVCP performs better when t is set as the maximum possible value, and so is best used in practice when maximising fault tolerance. Nevertheless, converging when n = 100 takes between 5 and 7 seconds, depending on t, which is practically reasonable.
E.2.2 Arbitrary ballot election
Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE) essentially combines AVCP with a threshold encryption scheme. To perform our benchmarks for the election scheme, we used pre-generated keying material for threshold encryption. We use the scheme [53] benchmarked in the previous section. Our experiment differs from experiments with AVCP in that ring signatures must also contain valid encryptions as per the threshold encryption scheme, and because all processes perform threshold decryption with respect to all decided ballots. Figure 4 compares the performance of AVCP with ABE as described above. As can be seen, there is some, but not a considerable amount, of overhead from introducing the election's necessary cryptographic machinery. The main factors here are an additional message step, additional message verifications, and, requiring the most additional effort, performing threshold decryption.
As can be seen (and was explored in Section E.2.1), AVCP performance degrades when t is non-optimal. Despite this, the election still takes longer to perform when t is increased. Consider the case where (n, t) = (100, 33). As shown in Figure 2 , combining k = t + 1 = 34 (valid) partial decryptions together takes roughly 30ms. Since each run of the experiment decides on at least n − t = 67 values, processes have to spend almost two seconds combining shares together. In the best case, each process has to verify that (n − t)t = 2211 shares are well-formed, which takes roughly 750ms. Thus, in addition to other cryptographic overhead, it is clear that increasing t affects election performance.
Notwithstanding, the election protocol performs well for reasonable values of n. At n = 100, the election roughly takes between 7.5 and 9 seconds to execute from start to finish. Given that the method for establishing anonymous channels used by processes is sufficiently reliable, we can expect to see comparable results in practice.
